Judicial Attitudes Toward
Multiple-Family Dwellings: A Reappraisal by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 28 | Issue 1 Article 13
Spring 3-1-1971
Judicial Attitudes Toward Multiple-Family
Dwellings: A Reappraisal
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Housing Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Judicial Attitudes Toward Multiple-Family Dwellings: A Reappraisal , 28 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 220
(1971), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol28/iss1/13
220 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
free from government intrusion. To hold otherwise is to violate
any reasonable interpretation of the sanctions of the fourth amend-
ment.
To argue that an individual, absent temporarily from his home, can
without his knowledge or consent, have his constitutional rights vicari-
ously waived by a member of his family is to subjugate an individual's
personal constitutional rights to the control of another. Likewise, to
base such an argument on the third party's right of possession and con-
trol of the premises is to deflect attention from the real issue. The
fourth amendment defines an individual's right and only the individual
should be allowed to waive it.
E. THOMAS COX
JUDICIAL ATTITUDES TOWARD
MULTIPLE-FAMILY DWELLINGS: A REAPPRAISAL
The desire of owners of single-family residences' to exclude mul-
tiple-family residences from their midst has been a source of continual
litigation in the courts.2 Originally, the courts tended to favor the
owners of single-family residences. 3 However, the later cases reveal a
'The term "single-family dwelling" is usually defined by the zoning ordinance,
which often requires judicial interpretation. See, e.g., Robertson v. Western Baptist
Hospital, 267 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1954) (residence for about twenty nurses a "one
family dwelling" within meaning of ordinance).
'There are usually three deviations from zoning ordinances which give rise to
litigation: the amendment, the variance, and the special exception.
Amendments to zoning ordinances generally arise in three situations: 1) where
existing ordinances have been found inadequate because of conditions which have
developed since the original ordinance was passed; 2) where the parcel was originally
undeveloped and subsequent development necessitates a zoning change; or 3) where
circumstances affecting a relatively small parcel have changed (often claims of spot
zoning arise here). See 1 RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING ch. 27-1 to
-42 (1969). The courts usually subject amendments to the same or similar tests
used when the validity of new zoning ordinances is questioned. See Rodgers v.
Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951).
Variances and special exceptions are both similar in that they are administered
by a local board of adjustment. Variances allow a use which is prohibited by the
zoning ordinance while special exceptions are uses permitted by the ordinance.
See RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 54-3 (1969). Compare VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.1-495 (1964) with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-39 (1967) (statutes governing
the granting of variances and special exceptions). In litigation involving variances
and special exceptions, the party contesting the validity of the board of adjustment's
actions must establish that the board acted "capriciously" and "arbitrarily." See
Koch v. City of Toledo, 37 F.2d 336 (6th Cir. 193o); Cameo Park Homes, Inc. v.
Planning and Zoning Commission of Stratford, i5o Conn. 672, 192 A.2d 886 (1963).
sSee, e.g., Koch v. City of Toledo, 37 F.2d 336 (6th Cir. 1930); DeLano v. City
of Tulsa, 26 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 654 (1929); Donovan
v. City of Santa Monica, 88 Cal. App. 2d 386, 199 P.2d 51 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948);
CASE COMMENTS
trend toward a balancing of opposing interests in the courts. 4 The re-
cent case of DeSimone v. Greater Englewood Housing Corp. No. Z5
adds a new facet to this developing trend.
In DeSimone the defendant, Greater Englewood Housing Corp. No.
i (hereinafter referred to as GEHC), was incorporated under a New
Jersey statute0 that recognized the existence of substandard housing as
detrimental to the public welfare The purpose of GEHC was to "aid
in clearance and reconstruction of blighted areas in the predominantly
black Fourth Ward of the city ... ."8 In order to comply with federal
regulations, it was necessary for GEHC to construct relocation housing
outside the predominantly black area.9 The site selected was a tract
located in a predominantly white single-family residence zone.10 Sev-
eral residents protested the planned construction.
GEHC applied for a zoning variance under an unusual New Jersey
statute which permits variances for "special reasons" in "particular
cases"." The variance was recommended by the Board of Adjustment
City of Bismarck v. Hughes, 53 N.D. 838, 2o8 N.W. 711 (1926); Kindergan v.
Borough of River Edge, 137 N.J.L. 296, 59 A.2d 857 (1948); Calm v. Guion, 27
Ohio App. 147, x6o N.E. 868 (1927); cf. In re Jennings' Estate, 33o Pa. 154, 198 A.
621 (1938) (fraternity house excluded from single-family residence zone).
'City of Phoenix v. Burke, 9 Ariz. App. 395, 452 P.2d 722 (1969); Marta v.
Sullivan, 256 A.2d 736 (Del. 1969); Metropolitan Dade County v. Pierce, 236 So. 2d
202 (Fla. 1970); Westfield v. City of Chicago, 26 IlL. 2d 526, 187 N.E.2d 208 (1962);
Marcus v. Montgomery County Council, 235 Md. 535, 201 A.2d 777 (1964); Pederson
v. Township of Harrison, 21 Mich. App. 535, 175 N.W.2d 817 (1970); Westwood
Forest Estates, Inc. v. Village of South Nyack, 23 N.Y.2d 424, 244 N.E.2d 700, 297
N.Y.S.2d 129 (1969); Methodist Home for Aged Fund v. Lawson, 61 Misc. 2d 184,
3o5 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1969); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., - Pa. -, 268 A.2d 765
(1970).
66 N.J. 428, 267 A.2d 31 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as DeSimone].
0N.J. STAT. ANN. § 55:16-i et seq. (1967). The pertinent statute reads in part:
It is hereby declared that there is a severe housing shortage in the
State; that there are places in many municipalities of the State
where dwellings lack proper sanitary facilities and are in need of
major repairs or unfit for residential use; that these conditions
are detrimental to the health, safety, morals welfare and reason-
able comfort of the people of the State ....
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 55:16-2 (1967).
FDeSimone, 267 A.2d at 33.
91d.
"267 A.2d at 33. The opinion did not specify which federal regulation com-
pelled GEHC to construct relocation housing outside the racially impacted area.
"Old.
"The pertinent subsection of this statute reads in part:
[The board of adjustment shall have the power to] [r]ecommend
in particular cases and for special reasons to the governing body
of the municipality the granting of a variance to allow a structure
or use in a district restricted against such structure or use. Where-
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and granted by the governing body of the city.' 2 Several residents of
the Second Ward attacked in Superior Court the validity of the actions
of the legislative and administrative bodies of the city. The court en-
tered judgment for the defendant, GEHC. The case was appealed to the
New Jersey Supreme Court which affirmed the decision of the lower
court.13
In affirming the lower court decision the supreme court noted the
purpose of GEHC, which it gleaned from the incorporation statute,"4
the conclusions of the Board of Adjustment and the findings of the
city council.' 5 The court surmised that the purpose of constructing
the relocation housing was to alleviate over-crowded, unsafe and un-
sanitary housing and that such a purpose was consonant with promo-
upon the governing body or board of public works may, by resolu-
tion, approve or disapprove such recommendation.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4 o:5 5 -3 9 (d) (Supp. 1970-71). For a brief discussion of the statute
see R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 14.15 (1968).
Most other variance statutes require the applicant for the change to establish
an undue hardship to him because of the present zoning ordinance. E.g., ALA.
CODE tit. 37, § 781 (Supp. 1969); ALAsKA STAT. § 29.10.234(3) (1962); ARIZ. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 9 -4 65 (C)(3 ), 11-807(B)(2) (1956); ARX. STAT. ANN. § 19-2829(2) (1968); CAL.
GOV'T. CODE § 659o6 (West 1966); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 106-2-17(2)(c), 139-
60-7(4) (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-6(3) (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, §
327(a)(3), tit. 9, § 2617(3) (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 176.14(3) (1966); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 69-824(2), -1211(3) (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-13-4 (Smith-Hurd 1962);
ch. 34, § 3154 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970); IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-778(4) (1960); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 358 A. 15(), 41412(3) (1949); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 19-2934(b) (1964);
LA. REV. STAT. § 33.140.32(3) (Supp. 1970); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30 § 495 4(2)(A)
(1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, §§ 7(g)(3), 22(g)(3) (1957); MAsS. ANN. LAWS ch. 4oA,
§ 15(3) (1966); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 5.2935, 5.2961(23), 5.2963(23) (1969); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 396.10 (1968), 462.22 (1963); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 64.12o(1)(5), 64.281(1)(3),
64.66o(i)(3) (1966); § 89.o9o(i)(3) (1952); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 11-2707(5)
(1968); 16-4103 <1967); NEB. REV. STAT. § 14-411 (1962), § 19.910(3) (Supp. 1969);
NEV. REv. STAT. § 278.3OO(1)(c) (1967); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:72 (II) (1955);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4 o: 5 5 -3 9 (d) (Supp. 1970-71); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267(5) (McKinney
Supp. 1970-71); N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 81(4) (McKinney 1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
153-266.17, 16o-178 (Supp. 1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 11-33-11 (1960); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 40-47-09 (1968); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5 19.14(B), 303.14(B) (1964);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 407(3) (Supp. 1970-71); tit. 19 § 865 (1962); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, §§ 14759, 25057, 67OO7 (1957); tit. 53, § 10912 (Supp. 1970); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 45-24-19(c) (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 14-375(2), 47-1009(3) (1962); S.D.
CODE § 11-4-17(3) (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 13-707(3), 13-409(3) (1955); TEx. RFv.
Civ. STAT. art. 1o1g(3) (1963); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-12(3), 17-27-16(3) (1962); VA.
CODE ANN. § 15.1-495(b) (1964); WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70.810(2) (1963); W.VA. CODE
ANN. § 8-24-55(4) (1969); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 59.99(7)(C), 62.23(7)(e)(7) (1957);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 18-288(c) (1957); § 15.1-89(e)(3) (1965). Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky,
Mississippi, and Oregon either do not sanction use variances or relegate the stand-
ards for granting them to the local governments.
'FDeSimone, 267 A.2d at 33-
"267 A.2d at 41.
"1N.J. STAT. ANN. § 55:16-1 et seq. (1967).
1267 A.2d at 37-38.
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tion of health, morals and general welfare of the public.16 Inasmuch as
the promotion of health, morals and general welfare is defined by
statute to be within the "special reasons" required by the pertinent
variance statute,17 the court concluded that the purpose of GEHC
satisfied the "special reasons" requirement.
The statute under which GEHC applied for its variance also had
a negative criterion that "[n]o relief may be granted . . .unless such
relief can be granted without substantial detriment to the public
good and will not substantially impair the intent and purpose of the
zone plan . ..."18 Relying primarily on the minimal detriment to the
adjacent land owners, the court concluded that this criterion had been
satisfied.19
The novelty of DeSimone becomes more apparent when the case is
viewed in the context of the trend developing in recent cases. 20 This
trend is not readily discernible until the later cases 2' are viewed
against the background of earlier judicial antipathy toward multiple-
family dwellings.
2 2
The courts' first wide-spread experiences with multiple-family
dwellings were during the mid-nineteenth century.2 3 These experi-
ences often involved the violation of fire and health regulations by tene-
ment owners.2 4 It has been suggested that the judiciary developed a
" 267 A.2d at 38.
17267 A.2d at 37, citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-32 (1967).
19N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-39 (1967).




2'E.g., Miller v. Benton, 55 Conn. 529, 13 A. 678 (1887); Commonwealth v.
Quinlan, 153 Mass. 483, 27 N.E. 8 (1891); Commonwealth v. Cogan, 107 Mass. (1
Browne) 212 (1871); Commonwealth v. Welch, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 51o (1861); Rose
v. King, 49 Ohio St. 213, 30 N.E. 267 (1892); Singer v. City of Philadelphia, 112
Pa. 410, 4 A. 28 (1886).
21Borough of Stamford v. Studwell, 6o Conn. 85, 21 A. 1o1 (1891) (building
repaired after fire did not constitute a new building or addition and -thus was not
required to comply with fire ordinance); Fire Dep't of City of New York v.
Chapman, so Daly 377 (Sup. Ct. 1882) (failure to install fire escape); Langdon v.
Fire Dep't of City of New York, 17 Wend. 234 (1837) (violation of ordinance re-
quiring fire wall); Rose v. King, 49 Ohio St. 213, 30 N.E. 267 (1892) (tenant allowed
to recover from landlord for injuries resulting from lack of fire escape which was
required by law); Singer v. City of Philadelphia, 112 Pa. 410, 4 A. 28 (1866) (in-
sufficient yard space as required by ordinance); Brice's Appeal, 89 Pa. 85 (1879)
(insufficient open space attached to building as required by ordinance).
In addition, early proceedings involving multiple-family dwellings often in-
volved conditions adverse to public morals. Commonwealth v. Welch, 84 Mass.
(2 Allen) 510 (1861) (liquor sold illegally in tenement), see People v. Hulett, 61
Hun. 62o, 15 N.Y.S. 630 (Sup. Ct. 1891) (maintenance of prostitution and other
forms of vice in bawdy house).
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distaste for multiple-family dwellings as a result of their experiences
during this period.25 This distaste carried over into the twentieth cen-
tury.26 During the early part of the twentieth century judicial opposi-
tion to multiple-family dwellings in single-family dwelling areas was
common 27 but by no means unanimous.
28
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company29 declared compre-
hensive zoning plans constitutional if such were based on a valid exer-
cise of the police power. Euclid eliminated many earlier constitutional
objections3O to exclusion of multiple-family dwellings from single-
family dwelling areas by means of zoning. The often quoted l Euclid
opinion provided, by way of dictum, new ammunition for those deter-
mined to exclude multiple-family dwellings from single-family resi-
dence areas. The opinion embraced the concept that apartments were
parasitic in nature,32 which some later cases adopted.33  The cases,
nBabcock and Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Boom, Ill
U. PA. L. REv. xo4o, 1O41-44 (1963).
2See Kitching v. Brown, 18o N.Y. 414, 73 N.E. 241 (1905); see also State v.
Rowland Lumber Co., 153 N.C. 61o, 69 S.E. 58 (1910).
'7Note 3 supra. Other forms of exclusion were also achieved by municipal
ordinances. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (brick making prohibited
within designated area); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 US. 171 (1915)
(livery stables prohibited within designated area).
2"There were several chinks in the judicial armor protecting single-family
residence areas. Some cases voided restrictions on multiple-family dwellings on the
basis of invalid exercise of the police power. See Calvo v. City of New Orleans, 136
La. 480, 67 So. 338 (1915); Fitzhugh v. City of Jackson, 132 Miss. 585, 97 So. 19o
(1923); State v. McKelvey, 3o Mo. 1, 256 S.W. 474 (1923). Other cases held that
zoning restrictions were invalid because of constitutional objections. See, e.g., State
ex rel. Lachtman v. Houghton, 134 Minn. 226, 158 N.W. 1017 (1916). Other cases
held that zoning should only prohibit a landowner from injuring others. See Wil-
lison v. Cooke, 54 Colo. 320, 130 P. 828 (1913); People ex rel. Friend v. City of
Chicago, 261 Ill. 16, 103 N.E. 609 (1913).
2272 U.S. 365 (1926).
10See, e.g., State ex rel. Lachtman v. Houghton, 134 Minn. 226, 158 N.W. 1017
(1916).
""Practically every zoning brief can be improved by including a quotation
from... Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 364... because this case is widely
recognized as fundamental to zoning law." C. CRAWFORD, STRATEGY AND TAcrIcs IN
MUNICIPAL ZONING 137 (1969).
"The Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company states
as follows:
With particular reference to apartment houses, it is pointed out
that the development of detached house sections is greatly retarded
by the coming of apartment 'houses, which has sometimes resulted
in destroying the entire section for private house purposes; that in
such sections very often the apartment house is a mere parasite,
constructed in order to take advantage of open spaces and at-
tractive surroundings created by the residential character of the
district. Moreover, the coming of one apartment house is followed
by others, interfering by their height and bulk with the free cir-
CASE COMMENTS
however, were careful to elaborate police power arguments so as to
comply with the constitutional requirements established in Euclid.34
The years after World War II saw a large expansion in apartment
construction35 and continued opposition to multiple-family dwellings
by owners of single-family residences.36 The early post-war cases, prior
to the mid-nineteen sixties, generally reflect this continued opposition
to multiple-family dwellings.37
The courts continued to substantiate their decisions with police
power arguments.3 s Typical of the early post-war cases was Ralph Peck
Holding Corp. v. Burns39 which relied on the problems resulting from
the undue concentration of population which an apartment would
culation of air and monopolizing the rays of the sun which other-
wise would fall upon the smaller homes, and bringing, as their
necessary accompaniments, the disturbing noises incident to in-
creased traffic and business, and the occupation, by means of mov-
ing and parked automobiles, of larger portions of the streets, thus
detracting from their safety and depriving children of the pri-
vilege of quiet and open spaces for play, enjoyed by those in
more favored localities,--until finally, the residential character of
the neighborhood and its desirability of detached residence are
utterly destroyed.
272 U.S. at 394.
3See, e.g., Fanale v. Borough of Hasbrouck 'Heights, 26 NJ. 320, 139 A.2d 749
(1958).
3'Note 3 supra.
In 196o there were 1.3 million housing structures started. Of these, I million
were one unit structures and 237 thousand were three or more unit structures.
In 1969 an estimated 1.5 million housing structures were started. Of these, 8it
thousand were single unit structures and 64o thousand were structures with three
or more units. BUREAU OF THE CENsus, DEPr. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ARsTRACr
OF THE UNrrED STATES (1970). See generally, G. NEUTzE, THE SUBURBAN APARTMENT
BooM (1968).
3A discussion of the post-war apartment boom suggested several reasons, or
rationalizations, used by owners of single-family dwellings in attempting to exclude
multiple-family dwellings from their midst. Among these were that apartments
create a tax burden on owners of single-family residences; apartments cut off air
and light, apartments will be tomorrow's slums; apartments destroy the character
of the community; apartments reduce existing property values. It has also been
suggested that the real motivating force behind exclusion of multiple-family
dwellings has been a desire to exclude minority groups or lower classes. Babcock
and Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Boom, ill U. PA. L. REv.
1o4o, 1o62 (1963). For a short discussion of "snob zoning" see R. ANDERSON,
AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 7-29 (1968).
31E.g., Tucker v. City of Atlanta, 211 Ga. 157, 84 S.E.2d 362 (1954); Gregory v.
City of Wheaton, 23 Ill. 2d 402, 178 N.E.2d 358 (i6i); Shadynook Improvement
Ass'n, Inc. v. Molloy, 232 Md. 265, 192 A.2d 502 (1963); Cohen v. City of Lynn,
333 Mass. 699, 132 N.E.2d 664 (1956); Fanale v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights,
26 N.J. 320, 139 A.2d 749 (1958); Kindergan v. Borough of River Edge, 137 N.J.L.
296, r9 A.2d 857 (1948); Ralph Peck Holding Corp. v. Burns, i6 Misc. 2d 256, 181
N.Y.S.2d 737 (1958); Andress v. City of Philadelphia, 410 Pa. 77, 188 A.2d 709 (1963).
MId.
116 Misc. 2d 256, 181 N.Y.S.2d 737 (195 8 )-
1971]
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cause.40 The court noted that among these problems were lack of rec-
reational facilities, 41 great distances from public transportation, 42 and
inadequate parking facilities. 43 Other cases in this period before the
mid-nineteen sixties employed such problems as the deleterious effect
of apartments44 and traffic congestion 45 in substantiating exclusion of
multiple-family dwellings from single-family residence areas.
While the early post-war cases generally reflect the desire of single-
family residence owners to exclude multiple-family dwellings from
their midst, there were indications of the new trend to come.46 Some
cases during this period held that the lack of adverse effect to neigh-
boring residents is conducive, but not determinative, to allowing
changes for the construction of multiple-family dwellings.4 7 Similarly,
where a multiple-family dwelling had existed for several years as an
illegal non-conforming use and there was no apparent decrease in
neighboring property values, a court declared the dwelling to be a
legal non-conforming use.48 These cases 49 indicate a willingness by
the courts involved to depart from a mechanical exclusion of multiple-
family dwellings from single-family residence areas when a police power
objection to the multiple-family dwelling exists.
40x81 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
"Id.
Q18i N.YS.2d at 739.
"Id.
"Fanale v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 26 N.J. 32o, 139 A.2d 749 (1958).
"Cameo Park Homes, Inc. v. Town of Stratford, 150 Conn. 672, 192 A.2d 886
(1963). But see Glen Rock Realty Co. v. Borough of Glen Rock, 8o N.J. Super.
79, 192 A.2d 865, 869 (1963) (dictum) (mere increase in traffic that does not exceed
hazardous level insufficient reason to deny zoning change).
"Cases cited note 47 infra. In 1963 it was noted:
[I]n recent months a few small clouds have appeared on the zon-
ing horizon which may forecast more serious judicial scrutiny of
traditional attitudes toward multiple-family development.
Babcock and Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Boom, 111 U. PA.
L. R v. 1o4o, 1o86 (1963).
"Pringle v. City of Chicago, 404 Ill. 473, 89 N.E.2d 365 (1949); cf. Quilici
v Village of Mount Prospect, 399 Ill. 418, 78 N.E.2d 240 (1948); Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. City of Chicago, 402 Ill. 581, 84 N.E.2d 825 (1949).
"9Westfield v. City of Chicago, 26 Ill. 2d 526, 187 N.E.2d 208 (1963). The
plaintiff had operated the multiple-family dwelling as an illegal nonconforming
use for several years before she was required to restore the premises to single-family
use by city authorities. Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment to have her property
declared a legal nonconforming use. In granting judgment for the plaintiff, the
court relied on the economic detriment to the plaintiff if required to restore the
premises to a single-family use and on the apparent lack of decrease of neighboring
property values during the years the premises was operated as a multiple-family
residence. The court equated the lack of decrease of neighboring property values
with a lack of detriment to the public.
ONotes 47 and 28 supra.
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The presently developing trend, however, first appearing in the
mid-nineteen sixties, is characterized by a judicial balancing of the
competing interests of the parties involved in the litigation. 0 In order
to achieve a balancing of interests, some courts have found it necessary
to allow themselves greater latitude in which to operate within the
police power framework. 51 In Pederson v. Township of Harrison52 the
court held the police power objections to a proposed multiple-family
dwelling were anticipatory in nature and did not bear the necessary
real and substantial relationship to public health, safety, morals or
general welfare.53 The courts have also held that communities have
other powers besides zoning with which to solve police power prob-
lems.5 4 By insuring that police power objections are real, and not
merely possible,55 and by forcing communities to use alternate means
to solve their police power problems, 56 the courts have allowed them-
selves greater latitude in which to balance the interests of the parties
to the litigation.
There are three usually distinct parties, whose interests are con-
sidered by the courts: the proponent of the multiple-family dwelling,
the opponent of the multiple-family dwelling, and the general public.
In City of Phoenix v. Burke57 the court adopted the trial court's find-
ings of fact that: the value of the property would increase if the pro-
posed apartments were constructed; many nearby parcels were actually
used for multiple-family and commericial uses; a city water filtration
plant was near the property in question; the property fronted on a
"Note 4 supra. There are, of course, many cases which uphold exclusion of
multiple-family residences from single-family residence zones. See Chatham Corp.
v. Beltram, 252 Md. 578, 251 A.2d 1 (1969); Style-Rite Homes, Inc. v. Town of
Chili, 54 Misc. 2d 866, 283 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1967); O'Neill v. Philadelphia County,
434 Pa. 331, 254 A.2d 912 (1969); Barbone v. City of Warwick, 264 A.2d 921 (R.I.
197o); see also Carlson v. City of Bellevue, 73 Wash. 2d 41, 435 P.2d 957 (1968)
(service station not permitted in single-family residence zone).
uPederson v. Township of Harrison, 21 Mich. App. 535, 175 N.W.2d 817
(ig7o); Westwood Forest Estates, Inc. v. Village of South Nyack, 23 N.Y.2d 424,
244 N.E.2d 700, 297 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1969); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., - Pa. -,
268 A.2d 765 (1970).
1' 1 Mich. App. 535, 175 N.W.2d 817 (1970).
G3175 N.W.2d at 8ig.
rAVestwood Forest Estates, Inc. v. Village of South Nyack, 23 N.Y.2d 424, 244
N.E.2d 700, 297 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1969); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., - Pa. -
268 A.2d 765 (1970).
OPederson v. Township of Harrison, 21 Mich. App. 535, 175 N.W.2d 817 (1970).
urWestwood Forest Estates, Inc. v. Village of South Nyack, 23 N.Y.2d 424, 244
N-E.-d 700, 297 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1969); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc. - Pa. -,
268 A.2d 765 (1970).
'79 Ariz. App. 535, 452 P.2d 722 (1969).
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major collector street; and there was no opposition to the requested
zoning by the adjacent property owners. 58 Here the competing inter-
ests were those of the proponent of the project and the general public.
The proponent's interests were largely economic: the increased value
of the property if the zoning were changed and the inability of the
proponent to obtain a mortgage under the present zoning restrictions.59
The city's objection was based on its contention that the present zoning
afforded a reasonable use of the property and that the zoning ordinance
provided for adequate multiple-family potential in other areas.00 The
court stated that while none of the proponent's contentions alone
would be sufficient to cause the present zoning to be deemed unrea-
sonable, an aggregate of indicia approach permitted the Arizona ap-
pellate court to sustain the lower court's finding that the zoning re-
striction was unreasonable.01 Hence, the interests of the proponent out-
weighed the minimal objections presented by the city representing the
general public.
Westwood Forest Estates, Inc. v. Village of South Nyack6 2 is similar
to City of Phoenix v. Burke63 in that the interests of the proponent of
an apartment project were weighed against the interests of the general
public. In Westwood Forest the township objected to a proposed
apartment building on the grounds that the sewage from the apartment
would pollute the Hudson River. The pollution was due to an inade-
quate treatment plant. The court ruled in favor of the apartment pro-
ject stating that since all members of the community contributed to
the pollution, it would be unfair to make the proponent bear the
burden alone by not granting him a zoning change. The court further
reasoned that the township could use alternate means to solve the
pollution problem.6 4 Thus, although the interests of the public were
strong, the existence of alternate solutions established the proponent's
interest as the prime consideration.
In Methodist Home for the Aged Fund v. Lawson66 the plaintiff
wanted to expand a privately owned nursing home by adding two more
floors to the already existing two-floor structure. The court noted the
mixed zoning character of the neighborhood. In arriving at its decision,
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the court reasoned tha tany detriment to the neighbors would be mini-
mal in light of the benefit which would accrue to the public by allowing
the zoning change.10 The court, however, found it necessary to establish
that an economic hardship would result to the proponent if the change
were denied.67 Here there was a balancing of interests between the pro-
ponent and the opponent of the addition. In allowing the zoning change
it is clear that the court felt that the proponent's interests outweighed
those of the opponent. The case is unusual in that the public interests
were in accord with those of the proponent's; however, the proponents
interests proved to be crucial.68
In all of the above cases where a zoning change was allowed it was
the proponent's interest which proved to be controlling. In DeSimone
a zoning change was allowed where the public's interest was deemed to
be controlling. By establishing the public's interest as a reason for al-
lowing construction of multiple-family dwellings in restricted zones,
DeSimone adds a new facet to the developing trend.
The impact of DeSimone has both practical and abstract aspects.
Its practical aspect is its relevance to the zoning problems involved in
urban renewal and public housing projects. 69 If the developer of the
project is able to rely solely on the public benefit of the project in ob-
taining zoning changes, it follows that under DeSimone zoning
ordinances will be less of a restriction on such projects. If, however, the
developer is required to rely on his own interests in dealing with zon-
ing problems, he subjects himself to the usual pitfalls of zoning litiga-
tion.7
0
The impact of DeSimone on urban renewal and public housing
zoning problems may be limited because of the uniqueness of the
statute under which the litigation was fought. However, the abstract
0305 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
67Id.
OsId.
0GUrban renewal has generally been regarded as within the police power of the
state. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); see also Sabaugh v. City of Dearborn,
16 Mich. App. 182, 167 N.V.2d 826 (1969) (city had authority to purchase apart-
ments in Florida to house its senior citizens). Urban renewal projects must conform
with the master plan of the community. Romeo v. Cranston Redevelopment Agency,
254 A.2d 426 (R.I. 1969); cf. United Oil Company, Inc. v. City of Stratford, 158
Conn. 364, 260 A.2d 596 (1969); Jacobs v. City of New York, 54 Misc. 2d 46, 281
N.Y.S.2d 867 (1966).
,OIn O'Niell v. Philadelphia County, 434 Pa. 331, 254 A.2d 12 (1969), the pro-
ponent wanted to increase the number of stories of his already existing apartment
house. Even though he was able to establish an economic detriment, the zoning
change was denied. Compare O'Niell with Methodist Home for the Aged Fund
v. Lawson, 61 Misc. 2d 184, 305 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1969).
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